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I.

INTRODUCTION TO THE META-TAG DISPUTE

Location, Location, Location. Even in cyberspace,1 these are still
the three most important factors in running a successful business. Just
ask Carl Oppedahl, the Internet-savvy lawyer and partner in the
Oppedahl & Larson law firm.2 His firm maintains a well known legal
page on the World Wide Web.' Mr. Oppedahl will occasionally enter
his firm's name into various "search engine" indexes to make sure
users can easily find and access his firm's Web site.4 Mr. Oppedahl,
like most Web site managers, is concerned with the location and
visibility of his Web site on these indexes.'
On one of his location checks, Mr. Oppedahl entered the words
"Oppedahl" and "Larson" into a popular search engine, AltaVista, and

* Cofounder, Minstrel Music Network, <http://www.m2n.com>, B.B.A., University of
Michigan; J.D., Seattle University School of Law, Class of 1999. The author would like to thank
Todd A. Weaver, his brother and the heart and soul of M2N, whose vision inspired this
Comment. In addition, the author thanks Michael T. Morgan for his belief and the rest of the
Weaver family for their support.
1. The term "cyberspace" was first used by the author William Gibson in his novel
Neuromancer and has come to represent the global network of computers commonly known as the
Internet. WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).
2. See Carl S. Kaplan, Hidden Meta- Tag Detours Take Litigants to a New Area of Law, N.Y.
TIMES ON THE WEB, CyberTimes (Aug. 28, 1997) <http://search.nytimes.com/books/
search/bin/fastweb?getdoc+cyber-lib+ 16886+0++me9/18/97>.
3. See id. Oppedahl & Larson's Web address is <http://www.patents.com>.
4. See Elizabeth Gardner, Trademark Battles Simmer Behind Sites, WEBWEEK, Aug. 25,
1997, at 1, 45. Search engines are on-line indexes that allow Internet users to identify Internet
resources (on the Web, FTP servers, and the Usenet) based upon specific criteria. John M.
Mrsich & Meeka Jun, Terms You Need to Know: Search Engines, 3 No. 7 MULTIMEDIA & WEB
STRATEGIST 3 (1997).
5. "Getting a good listing in those indexes is crucial for a small business and will become
more crucial as E-commerce takes off." Eamonn Sullivan, Escapingfrom Search Engine Hell, PC
WEEK, Sept. 22, 1997, at 33.
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up popped a hit list of many Web sites that met the search criteria. 6
Among Oppedahl & Larson's listed entries were links to three Web
sites that Mr. Oppedahl knew were unaffiliated with his firm.' The
three mysterious URLs' were <http://www.advancedconcepts.com>,
<http://www.prowebsite.com>, and <http://www.codeteam.com>.'
Upon inspection of the HTML code,"° Mr. Oppedahl discovered that
each suspect Web page had concealed his firm's name eight times in
their hidden programming text through a series of programming
techniques. 1 The main technique utilized by the three aforementioned Web sites was to refer to "Oppedahl" and "Larson" in the
"Meta-Tag" portion of their underlying source code.' 2
Meta-Tags, in essence, are signposts that notify search engines of
the content of Web sites and facilitate keyword matches. They are
"embedded descriptive text that is hidden to the viewer of the page but
readable by search engines."' 3 After discovering the Meta-Tags,
Oppedahl & Larson brought an action for federal unfair competition,
federal trademark dilution, common law unfair competition, and
common law trademark infringement in the District Court of Colorado
against Advanced Concepts, Code Team - LBK, Inc., Professional14
Website Development, and the respective Web site administrators.
The main allegation underlying all four causes of action is that the

6. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 45. AltaVista, located at <http://www.altavista.com>, is
one of a number of search engines available on the World Wide Web.
7. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 45.
8. A URL (Uniform Resource Locator) as defined at <http://www.whatis.com> is the
address of a file (resource) available on the Internet. The type of resource depends on the
Internet application protocol. On the World Wide Web (which uses the Hypertext Transfer
Protocol), some examples of URLs are: <http://www.m2n.com>, <http://www.whatis.com>,
<http://www.law.seattleu.edu>, and <http://www.usdoj.gov>.
9. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 45.
10. Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) as defined at <http://www.whatis.com> consists
of "markup" symbols or codes inserted in a file intended for display on a World Wide Web
browser. The markup tells the web browser how to display a Web page's words and images for
the user. Every Web site's HTML programming code can be viewed by selecting the "Page
Source" option on the Netscape Navigator® Web browser or the "Source" option on the Internet
Explorer® Web browser.
11. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 45.
12. See id.
13. Guy Alvarez, A Beginner's Guide to Search Engines and Directories, 11 No. 2 MARKETING FOR LAWYERS 5, 7 (1997). "Search engines build their databases by deploying robotic
software that scans home pages. The robot looks for words that match the searcher's request.
The first place the robot looks when it scan a Web site's home page is the 'Meta' tag line .
Id.
14. See Complaint, Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-CV-1592 (D. Colo.
filed July 23, 1997). A copy of the complaint is available on Oppendahl & Larson's Intellectual
Property Law web server (visited Sept. 16, 1998) <http://www.patents.com/ac/complain.sht>.
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defendant's use of "Oppedahl" and "Larson" in their Meta-Tag code
caused their Web sites to be confusingly listed on AltaVista's index,
resulting in damage to plaintiffs business, goodwill, reputation, and
profits.'" Oppedahl & Larson insinuated that the only motivation for
the allegedly infringing Web sites including "Oppedahl" and "Larson"
use Oppedahl & Larson's
in their Meta-Tags was to impermissibly
6
users.'
attract
to
name
good
Mr. Oppedahl's case is a microcosm of potential Meta-Tag
disputes and, therefore, is an excellent place to begin analyzing the
judiciary's optimal role in regulating Meta-Tag activity. Not only is
this the first case to be filed solely on the Meta-Tag issue,' 7 but it is
also likely to be the most blatant example of such abuse. The alleged
infringing sites have no affiliation whatsoever with Oppedahl &
Larson, competitive or otherwise.'" This lack of affiliation leads to
the obvious conclusion that the "infringing" Meta-Tags are in place
solely to benefit from Oppedahl & Larson's name in an effort to gain
search engine exposure. While the Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced
Concepts case was ultimately settled out of court, 19 its facts illustrate
the conceptual legal questions posed by Meta-Tag technology.
Oppedahl & Larson is a sign of the electronic times. The
judiciary must first define its role in setting the boundaries of the
Internet as a fledgling commercial medium before a decision on MetaTag regulation can be reached. For electronic commerce to thrive,
users need to feel that there is order on the Internet. Without the
guiding hand of the courts, this order cannot be achieved. Ironically,
established laws and judicial regulation simultaneously threaten the
innovation, experimentation, and unique culture that makes the
Internet so attractive to both users and commercial investors. It is
imperative in this, the early morn of electronic commerce, that the
judiciary pick its battles carefully to encourage, rather than stifle, the
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 45. The Northern District Court of California granted
an injunction that implicates Meta-Tags against a defendant who infringed the protected marks
PLAYBOY and PLAYMATE. Playboy Enter. Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp.
1218, 1220-21 (N.D. Cal. 1997). However, the defendant in that case used the protected marks
in domain names both in the visible text of the Web pages and in their Meta-Tags. See id.
While the court did issue an injunction against the defendant's continued use of the marks in their
Meta-Tag code, no decision was reached on the Meta-Tag issue specifically. See id. at 1221-22.
18. See Complaint, supra note 14.
19. Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-CV-1592 (D. Colo. filed July 23,
1997) (case closed Feb. 9, 1998). A timeline following the disposition of this case is available on
Oppedahl & Larson's Intellectual Property Law web server (visited Sept. 16, 1998)
<http://www.patents.com/ac/index.sht>.
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development of the electronic marketplace. The next stretch of the
information superhighway travels right between the Scylla of jurisprudential apathy and the Charybdis of judicial activism. The success of
the Internet depends, in no small part, on the judiciary's ability to
navigate this stretch of road.
Meta-Tags are not just signals embedded in programming code,
they also signal an important juncture for the judiciary on the
information superhighway. Courts have already decided to err on the
side of regulation when dealing with another harbinger of increased
Internet litigation, domain name infringement. 20 However, judicial
involvement in domain name disputes should not dictate judicial
regulation of Meta-Tag abuse. Each unique legal problem posed by
Internet technology should be treated like the next fork in the road.
Only then can the judiciary ensure the correct balance between
indifference and interference.
The judiciary is in a position to support the growth of electronic
commerce by exercising prudence when deciding Meta-Tag disputes.
Courts should realize that the current source of trademark law, the
Lanham Act,21 does not address the unique nature and function of
Meta-Tags. While domain names are visible addresses used specifically for locating sites on the World Wide Web, Meta-Tags are invisible
programming protocols used to facilitate private search engine
indexing.2 2 Because the relevant test for trademark infringement is
the public's likelihood of confusion,23 this visibility distinction makes
all the difference in the world. The Lanham Act was simply not
enacted to regulate invisible programming code and should. therefore
not be used for that purpose. Because there is no law addressing the
unique nature of Meta-Tags, courts should defer to the marketplace
until a legislative body decides to tailor a law specifically targeted at
the problems they create.

20. A domain name, as described at <http://www.whatis.com>, locates an organization or
entity on the Internet. On the Web, the domain name is that part of the Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) that tells a domain name server using the DNS (domain name system) whether
and where to forward a request for a Web page. Courts have found trademark infringement in
a number of cases where "cybersquatters" register an established company's trademark as their
own proprietary domain name. See, e.g., Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D.
Ill. 1996).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1998).
22. See Alvarez, supra note 13, at 7.
23. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enter. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
"Likelihood of confusion is the basic test for both common law trademark infringement and
federal statutory trademark infringement." Id. at 1403.
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The focus of this Comment is not merely to analyze the role of
the judiciary in Meta-Tag litigation specifically, but also to use MetaTags as a lens with which to examine the potential effect of judicial
activism on Internet commerce in general. The first portion of this
analysis focuses on the applicability of federal trademark infringement
and dilution laws in Meta-Tag abuse suits. The next portion of the
article evaluates why market regulation of Meta-Tag abuse is the
correct course of action, in the short-term, for ensuring the growth of
electronic commerce. The article concludes with a description of
potential long-term regulation alternatives and analyzes the practicality
of each.

II.

META-TAG SUITS-THE FIRST SIGN OF COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION ON THE INTERNET?

It is no coincidence that one of the first significant commercial
disputes on the Internet is in the Meta-Tag context. Even though
President Clinton in his A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce24 predicted that "commerce on the Internet could total tens of
billions of dollars by the turn of the century,"25 the Internet's primary
purpose continues to be communication and information retrieval.26
Not surprisingly, most substantive Internet litigation to date has dealt
with issues pertaining to the legality of making certain images and
speech publicly accessible. 27 However, as a new commercial dawn is
breaking and President Clinton's prediction is coming to fruition, the
first commercial Internet litigation has emerged in the arena of
trademark law.28

24.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON AND ALBERT GORE, JR., A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (The White House ed., 1997) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK].
25. Id. at 2.
26. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). "The Internet is 'a unique and wholly new
medium of worldwide human communication."' Id. at 2334 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
27. See id. In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) barring indecency on the Internet were
unconstitutional. Id. at 2350. Other types of Internet claims include: defamation, violations of
privacy, libel, slander, and breach of security. See Byron F. Marchant, On-Line on the Internet:
First Amendment and Intellectual Property Uncertaintiesin the On-Line World, 39 HOW. LJ. 477,
491 (1996).
28. Many disputes have arisen when a Web designer registers a domain name that may
confuse a user as to the origin of the site. An example of a famous domain name dispute occurred
when Wired magazine writer Joshua Quittner registered the domain "mcdonalds.com" and invited
his readers to e-mail him at: romald@mcdonalds.com. This particular dispute was settled
amicably out of court. See Neal J. Friedman & Kevin Siebert, The Name is Not Always the Same,
20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 631, 646 (1997).
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Domain name and Meta-Tag disputes are the first manifestations
of the inevitable onslaught of commercial litigation that Internet
technology will create. As companies begin to use the World Wide
Web to facilitate business transactions rather than to facilitate
information gathering like advertising, commercial Internet disputes are
certain to multiply exponentially. Courts have already decided to
regulate domain name infringement through the provisions of the
Lanham Act,29 rather than allowing either the marketplace or Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), a private domain name provider, to correct
the problem."a Courts now must decide whether the hidden programming text at issue in Meta-Tag suits is analogous to the visible
addresses at issue in domain name disputes. This determination will
dictate whether the Lanham Act's "likelihood of confusion" test is
applicable in the Meta-Tag context.
The argument that Meta-Tags confuse users is presumably fueled
by the concern that Internet-savvy companies are able to use them to
siphon users from their direct competitors. At first blush, this concern
seems well-founded in that Meta-Tag disputes are more likely to arise
between companies competing in similar markets than between totally
unrelated companies.3 1 For example, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana granted Insituform Technologies' request
for an injunction against National EnviroTech Group, which embedded Insituform's name in its Meta-Tag code.32 The companies are
direct competitors in the trenchless pipeline market.3 3 As part of the
ruling, National EnviroTech must also ensure that the search engines
stop routing queries intended for Insituform to its own site.34 An
empirical example of commercial Meta-Tag use, where no dispute has
yet ensued, can be seen when "D-I-S-N-E-Y" is entered into the
AltaVista search engine and the first two sites listed in the search
results are for travel agencies.3" A similar situation prompted the

29. See, e.g., MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
30. See generally Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or SelfRegulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contractingfor Governance in Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475 (1997).
31. This is part of the reason why Oppedahl & Larson is such a remarkable case. The fact
that the alleged infringers have no competitive correlation with the plaintiff illustrates the fact that
companies are using familiar marks as Meta-Tags solely to garner more Internet traffic.
32. See Insituform Tech., Inc. v. Nat'l EnviroTech, No. 97-2064 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1997)
(order granting injunction).
33. Compare <http://www.insituform.com> with <http://www.nationalliner.com>.
34. See John Fontana, Trademark Trickery, TECHWIRE, Sept. 29, 1997.
35. See Wendy R. Liebowitz, Firm Sues for Invisible Use of Its Trademark on 'Net, NAT'L
L. J., Sept. 8, 1997, at A7.
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Web directory InfoSpace to voluntarily pull its competitor
WorldPages' name from its Meta-Tag code after it received threatening e-mails from WorldPages' president.36 The InfoSpace example
illustrates an interesting phenomenon, because after removing the
"infringing" Meta-Tag, they simply put WorldPages' name in the
visible text of their Web site, achieving the same result.37
While it is tempting to use trademark law to regulate Meta-Tag
usage in blatant abuse cases like Oppedahl & Larson, the effectiveness
of the Lanham Act becomes suspect when Meta-Tag suits involve
companies in direct competition. Courts should be wary of the
effectiveness of trademark law whenever the "fair use38 trademark
infringement defense becomes applicable.39 If the Lanham Act
governed Meta-Tag disputes, PepsiCo. could not be certain whether
its inclusion of COCA-COLA in its Meta-Tag code constitutes
infringement. While this criticism of the Lanham Act's "fair use"
provision is not unique to the context of the Internet, it does take on
an added significance in cyberspace. When the likely remedy for a
Meta-Tag suit is a court order mandating one word be deleted from a
HTML program, the time and expense of a "fair use" determination
at trial is more than prohibitive, it is nonsensical. When companies in
direct competition, like InfoSpace and WorldPages,4 ° are embroiled
in a Meta-Tag dispute, courts should recognize that a trademark
infringement action is fruitless.
The Second Circuit realized this fruitlessness when it stated that
"attempting to apply established trademark law in the fast-developing
world of the Internet is somewhat like trying to board a moving bus
"41 Perhaps courts should heed this warning and exercise restraint
when Meta-Tag suits between competitors appear. More importantly,
perhaps this warning will help courts realize that many of the problems

36. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 45.
37. See id. While not as effective as including the names in the Meta-Tag code, visible text
is also used by some search engines to make keyword matches.
38. These "fair use" questions in the competitive context are not the focus of this
Comment, however, because they beg the broader question of whether Meta-Tag abuse is even
a wrong that trademark law, either state or federal, is meant to, or more importantly should,
address. If Congress never anticipated the problems raised by Meta-Tag abuse, it does not seem
proper to analogize Meta-Tag abuse to previous trademark infringement cases.
39. See, e.g., The New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th
Cir. 1992). "The 'fair use' defense, in essence, forbids a trademark registrant to appropriate a
descriptive term for his exclusive use and so prevent others from accurately describing a
characteristic of their goods." Id. at 306.
40. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 45.
41. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997).
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caused by the electronic marketplace should be resolved by the
marketplace and not by judicial intervention.
III.

FEDERAL TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND DILUTION AND
STATE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAWS: THE CURRENT
ALTERNATIVES FOR COMBATING META-TAG ABUSE

Before settling the case, Oppedahl & Larson sought redress for
their Meta-Tag grievance by stating three traditional Lanham Act
claims. Their Complaint alleges that the defendants' use of the
registered mark OPPEDAHL & LARSON in their Meta-Tag code
constituted federal trademark infringement, federal unfair competition,
and federal trademark dilution.42 The following analysis sets the
groundwork for the next section which details the reasons why federal
courts should construe trademark law narrowly and leave Meta-Tag
abuse to market regulation.
A.

Federal Trademark Infringement

To prove trademark infringement, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant's use of his or her mark is likely to cause consumer
confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the defendant's goods or
services.43 Each of the United States Courts of Appeals has developed its own multifactor test for determining the requisite likelihood
of confusion for trademark infringement.44 For example, the factors
used by the Tenth Circuit, the circuit in which Oppedahl & Larson
was filed, to determine likelihood of confusion are as follows:
(a) the degree of similarity between the marks;
(b) the intent of the alleged infringer in adopting its mark;
(c) the relation in use and the manner of marketing between the
goods or services marketed by the competing parties;
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers;
(e) evidence of actual confusion; and

42. See Complaint, supra note 14. In the interests of uniformity and conciseness, this
Comment narrows its focus to an analysis of how Meta-Tag causes of action should be resolved
under current federal trademark law schemes.
The Colorado common law trademark causes of action pleaded in Oppedahl & Larson's
complaint are predicated on a "likelihood to deceive ordinary customer" test. See, e.g., Driverless
Car Co. v. Glessner-Thornberry Driverless Car Co., 264 P. 653, 654 (Colo. 1928). This author
chose to focus on federal trademark claim analysis in the belief that state trademark claims would
be analyzed and disposed of in a manner consistent with their federal counterparts.
43. See, e.g., Quality Inns Int'l Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md.
1988).
44. See 3 J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24.06[4] (3d ed.
rev. 1995).
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the strength or weakness of the marks.45

(f)

Because these factors are interrelated, no one factor is dispositive.46
It is, however, not the purpose of this Comment to parse through the
various factors. It is sufficient for the present analysis to note that
"likelihood of confusion" is the basic test for trademark infringement.47
When analyzing a Meta-Tag claim, it is important to realize that
the likelihood of confusion requirement has a broad scope. In addition
to "point-of-sale" confusion, "pre-sale" and "post-sale" confusion are
also actionable. 48 Point-of-sale confusion is exactly what it sounds
like: A purchaser is confused as to what he or she is buying at the
time he or she is buying it.49 The fact that the "likelihood of
confusion" requirement's scope is broader than mere "point-of-sale"
confusion is important in Meta-Tag cases because Meta-Tags
(arguably) cause confusion on search engines, not on the registered
mark holder's Web site.
Confusion on search engines, while obviously not "point-of-sale"
confusion, can be seen as "pre-sale" confusion. "Pre-sale" confusion
was discussed in Blockbuster Entertainment v. Laylco, ° where the
court stated the fact "that a customer would recognize that Video
Busters is not connected to Blockbuster after entry into a Video Buster
store .

.

. is unimportant.

The critical issue is the degree to which

Video Busters might attract potential customers based on its mark's
similarity to the Blockbuster name."5 " Because Meta-Tags are meant
to attract users, this case can certainly be used to argue that Meta-Tag
abuse creates "pre-sale" confusion that is actionable in a federal
trademark infringement case.
There is, however, an all-important difference between the
Blockbuster case and Meta-Tag abuse cases. In Blockbuster, the
The mark led consumers to Video
disputed mark was visible.
they were confused when they
because
Blockbuster,
Buster, instead of
saw the similar trademark. Users viewing "tainted" indexes brought

45. First Savings Bank v. First Bank System Inc., 101 F.3d 645, 652 (10th Cir. 1996).
46. See id.
47. See MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 23.01[1].
48. See Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-Tags: An
Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 243, 248 (1998).
49. See id.
50. 869 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
51. Id. at 513.
52. Id. at 508.
53. Id.

676
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on by Meta-Tag abuse, on the other hand, have never seen the
allegedly infringing mark. Meta-Tag abuse cases are thus more
analogous to the proverbial "tree falling in the woods with no one
around," than to Blockbuster, where a potential buyer can be misled by
similar visible trademarks. This is not to say that Meta-Tag abuse
should be encouraged or condoned. It is merely to say that trademark
law and judicial regulation are not the best means by which to combat
such abuse, because premature legal interference can upset the global
and self-regulatory nature of the Internet.
B. Federal Unfair Competition
Unfair competition claims overlap with trademark infringement4
claims in that they both include "likelihood of confusion" tests.1
The different categories of federal unfair competition that exist under
the Lanham Act include passing off," false advertising, 6 and false
designation of origin.5 7 The applicable rules of each claim are
discussed below.
1. False Advertising
A "false advertising" unfair competition claim is somewhat
different than either the "passing off" or "false designation of origin"
claims discussed below. The "false advertising" section of the Lanham
Act specifically prohibits the use of a "false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact [in] commercial
advertising or promotion [which] misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services or commercial activities.""8 To establish a cause of
action for false advertising, the plaintiff must show either that the
allegedly infringing statement is literally false, or that it is likely to
deceive or confuse customers.3 9 False advertising claims are thus
predicated on a statement or assertion that confuses customers.
Because Meta-Tags are not assertions, they should not be
construed as advertising, as defined in the "false advertising" context.
Meta-Tags are simply programming code, in place to interface with

54.

See, e.g., Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 1998);

Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Ernest & Julio Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 1998);
Pappan Enter., Inc. v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc., 143 F.3d 800 (3d Cir. 1998).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1998).

56. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (1998).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1998).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1998).
59. See Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 855 (2d Cir. 1997).
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search engine software. They should be characterized as such and
courts should refrain from labeling them as a statement or assertion.
If courts begin to characterize Meta-Tags as statements and not as
programming code, they open the door to judicial censorship of
functional programming language under the auspices of regulating
content.
2. Passing Off and False Designation of Origin
Unlike trademark infringement, "passing off' provides a cause of
action for unfair competition even though the plaintiffs goods or
services are not federally registered.6" The requirements for a federal
unfair competition "passing off' claim are: (1)an association of origin
by the consumer between the mark and the first user, and (2) a
likelihood of consumer confusion when the mark is applied to the
second user's good or service." "Passing off" and "false designation
of origin" claims are difficult to distinguish in that they both make
confusion between goods or services actionable6 2 and any differences
between the two are not important for the purposes of this Comment.
What is important for Meta-Tag abuse analysis is the fact that both
claims have "likelihood of confusion" elements.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals states that likelihood of
confusion in unfair competition claims occurs "when consumers make
an incorrect mental association between the involved commercial
products or their producers. '"63 Again, this test presupposes the
condition that the consumer actually sees the word or term that falsely
designates the origin of a good or service. 64 The author of this
Comment found no instance in the history of Lanham Act trademark
protection jurisprudence where the public was found likely to be
confused by the use of a mark completely hidden from the public's
view. It seems improbable that consumers can make an "incorrect
mental association," when they cannot even see the word that is
supposed to create that mental association.65

60. See Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1991).
61. See Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co. Inc., 904 F. Supp. 1409, 1417
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 124 F.3d 402 (2d Cir. 1997).
62. Compare Coach Leatherware Co., 933 F.2d 162, with American Rolex Watch Corp. v.
Ricoh Time Corp., 491 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1974).
63. Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 966 (10th Cir. 1996)
(citing San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 564
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1998).
65. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 966.
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The visibility issue has been peripherally addressed by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. In American Rolex Watch Corp. v. Ricoh
Time Corp.,66 the Second Circuit held that the use of a mark on a
watch was not violative of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act because the
"trident" mark on the defendant's watches, even though it looked
much like the plaintiffs "crown" mark, was very small, especially in
comparison with the defendant's trade name RICOH which was
prominently displayed on every watch sold.67 The Court of Appeals
did not find unfair competition in American Rolex because the mark
was small, albeit visible, and the watch was otherwise labeled in a
nonconfusing manner."
American Rolex can be analogized to the Meta-Tag situation. The
Second Circuit balanced the impact of the small "trident" against the
prominently marked trade name "Ricoh." In Meta-Tag disputes,
courts should balance the impact of an invisible word against the
impact of the graphical identification visible on the Web site behind
the link. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, courts should
never base an infringement case solely on Meta-Tag abuse, but should
focus on the content of the visible text and graphics on the Web page
itself. When a Meta-Tag plaintiff, like Oppedahl & Larson, pleads
only that a defendant's Meta-Tags are the source of the alleged
infringement,69 courts should follow the logic of American Rolex and
direct a verdict for the defendants.
Courts have still not addressed an infringement or unfair
competition claim solely predicated on Meta-Tag abuse. While it is
true that the Northern District Court of California, in Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label,° enjoined a defendant from
using the protected marks PLAYBOY or PLAYMATE in its MetaTag code, it did so in conjunction with orders against continued use of
the marks in the defendant's domain names and visible Web page
text.71 No court has, to date, decided a case solely based on MetaTag abuse. That type of case would hinge entirely on the invisible
mark's ability to confuse the public and the court's determination that
extra listings on a search engine index list can cause the requisite
confusion in the public. Courts should be aware of the distinction
between the visible text of Web sites and invisible Meta-Tags and the

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

491 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 879.
Id.
See Complaint, supra note 14.
985 F. Supp. 1218, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
See id.
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potential for each to confuse the public. Because Meta-Tag abuse is
conceptually different than traditional trademark infringement, it
should be treated sui generis by the courts.
3.

Federal Dilution

The third way in which a plaintiff can recover on a Meta-Tag
abuse claim is under a federal dilution claim. On January 16, 1996,2
the Lanham Act was amended to encompass trademark dilution.1
The amendment defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless
of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake,
73
or deception.
The amendment, if applied in the Meta-Tag context, would
require courts to decide that the extra inclusion of links on a search
engine index page inhibits the ability of trademarks to identify or
distinguish goods and services.
In making this assessment, courts cannot turn to the language of
the Lanham Act, because it does not specify how dilution occurs or
how it may be detected and measured.74 State dilution statutes can
be used to help define what constitutes dilution, however. While
courts applying state dilution statutes recognize two distinct types of
dilution,7 5 this Comment focuses only on the type of dilution known
as "blurring. "76
In Panavision Intern. v. Toeppen, 77 the Central District Court of
California stated that blurring "'involves a whittling away' of the
selling power and value of a trademark by unauthorized use of the
mark."7 " Protecting famous marks against blurring prevents individuals who have seen both the junior and senior marks from associating
the two with each other, thereby diluting the power of the senior mark

72. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1996).
73. Id.
74. See Kuester & Nieves, supra note 48, at 251.
75. The two recognized types of dilution are "tarnishment" and "blurring." Dilution
through tarnishment "generally arises when the plaintiffs trademark is linked to products of
shoddy quality or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering
thought about the owner's product." Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir.
1994). Because a Meta-Tag is merely programming code used as an index tool and really has no
positive or negative connotations, this Comment will focus on "blurring" dilution exclusively.
76. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1031 (2d Cir. 1989).
77. 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
78. Id. at 1304.
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to "identify and distinguish" its goods and services.79 The association
between the senior and junior marks reaches "blurring" status when
the similarities between the two marks become so great as to cause
confusion.8" While a Meta-Tag and a senior mark can in some cases
be virtually the same (e.g., OPPEDAHL and LARSON and OPPEDAHL & LARSON), there will still be no association unless the user
sees the Meta-Tag. Invisible Meta-Tags simply do not have the ability
to make a mark like COCA-COLA less effective in identifying or
distinguishing its fine carbonated beverage from its competitors.
Meta-Tag abuse is one of many unique problems that has
originated entirely from Internet technology. Courts should therefore
address the problem sui generis and should not attempt to judicially
regulate it using trademark laws enacted before Meta-Tags were even
invented. Even cases of Meta-Tag abuse as blatant as Oppedahl &
Larson should simply not be regulated by the judiciary at this time.
Because Meta-Tags are an entirely new phenomenon, courts should
find the Lanham Act inapplicable in Meta-Tag abuse cases and should
let technology and the market deal with the problem.
IV. WHY THE CURRENT ALTERNATIVES ARE UNSATISFACTORY
FOR SOLVING COMMERCIAL INTERNET DISPUTES

There are essentially two reasons why the current alternatives for
redress in Meta-Tag disputes are unsatisfactory. The first is that
trademark law is ill-equipped to govern Meta-Tag disputes because of
the unique nature and function of search engine indexing on the World
Wide Web. The second is that the global nature of the Internet
militates against the use of one country's trademark law to settle
commercial disputes, let alone the common law of specific states.
A.

The Unique World of Search Engine Indexing

Meta-Tag abuse is undoubtedly occurring on the World Wide
Web and needs to be addressed. The first question, however, is
whether trademark law is the correct vehicle for addressing the
problem. There are a multitude of reasons to conclude that it is not.
Trademark law is designed to protect the owners of a mark.
While Oppedahl & Larson contend that defendants' Meta-Tag use of
their mark detracts from its value, the extent of the detraction appears
negligible. Search engines utilize Meta-Tags for building a content
79. Ringling Bros. Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 615 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(in comparing preamendment Lanham Act analysis to state "blurring" dilution).
80. Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1031.
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database so that the search engine will list those sites whose Meta-Tags
match the keywords entered by the user.8 The defendants' use of
"Oppedahl" and "Larson" in their Meta-Tags does not preclude users
from accessing Oppedahl & Larson's Web page. 2 Users are also
unlikely to be confused as to the origin of the defendants' Web pages,
because there are no overt references to Oppedahl & Larson. 3 While
the inclusion of excess sites on a returned search index list may dilute
the impact of a site's listing on an index, the inclusion does not dilute
the ability of a mark to identify its corresponding site once the user
accesses it.
This situation is distinguishable from domain name trademark
infringement cases where a visible URL is the centerpiece of the
litigation. The case of Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen,"4 is an excellent
example of the differences between Meta-Tag disputes and domain
name disputes. The defendant, Toeppen, registered approximately 240
domain names without seeking permission from the entities that had
previously used the names he registered. The plaintiff, Intermatic,
sued under both trademark infringement and unfair competition,
alleging a likelihood of confusion and requesting an injunction against
the defendant's continued control over the domain name.86 The court
denied Intermatic's summary judgment motion as to its infringement
claim, but granted summary judgment as to its dilution claim. The
court's motivation for granting the summary judgment on the dilution
claim was that "dilution of Intermatic's mark is likely to occur because
the domain name appears on the web page and is included on every
page that is printed from the web page." 88 Since Meta-Tags are never
visible, they are entirely different from domain names. Therefore, the
fact that the defendant in Playboy9 was enjoined from continuing
Meta-Tag abuse can, and should, be seen as ancillary relief that was

81. See Alvarez, supra note 13, at 7.
82. All sites with "Oppedahl" or "Larson" in their Meta-Tags will be returned by the
search engine. Each entry returned will have a brief description of what the attached Web site
contains. Users can either narrow the search they have initiated by selecting another keyword or
they can directly access any listed site. This process, while difficult to explain, is simple to
understand in practice. Altavista, <http://www.altavista.com>, and Infoseek, <http://www.
infoseek.com>, are examples of search engines that utilize Meta-Tag searches. See id.
83. See Complaint, supra note 14; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
84. 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. I11.1996).
85. Id. at 1230.
86. Id. at 1234-35.
87. Id. at 1236, 1241.
88. Id. at 1240.
89. Playboy Enter. Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1218, 1220-21 (N.D. Cal.
1997).
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granted only because the court first found domain name infringement.
However, when a court is presented with a claim based entirely on
Meta-Tag abuse, it should decline the invitation to render a judgment
based on current trademark law.
It is logical to say that the inclusion of unrelated Web sites on a
search index may impede the user's ability to find the Web site for
which they are searching. Although users are likely to be confused
about why unrelated Web sites are listed, there is no reason to think
that an "infringing" Web site's presence on a search list will confuse
users about the origin of each individual Web site listed. The
allegedly infringing Web sites in Oppedahl & Larson contain no visible
references to the Oppedahl & Larson law firm. Users simply do not
have the capacity for confusion when they are not privy to those visible
references." It is unclear how additional listed Web sites affect the
value of the OPPEDAHL & LARSON mark, especially when the
allegedly infringing Web sites contain no visible references to the
Oppedahl & Larson law firm.9'
Courts should determine that trademark law does not cover
situations in which the allegedly infringing use is invisible to users, and
the effect of the alleged infringement does not preclude users from
accessing the mark owner's Web site. This is not to say that the
defendants' behavior should be condoned. This Comment is merely
seeking to question whether trademark litigation is the appropriate
means to seek redress.
In evaluating the correct means of redress, it is important to note
that search engines are run by private companies that have the right to

90. Inspection of defendants' Web sites will bear out this conclusion.
question are:
* <http://prowebsite.com/server.html>;
* <http://www.codeteam.com/msiorder.htm>;
* <http://www.advancedconcepts.com/products.html>;
* <http://www.advancedconcepts.com/whois.html>;
* <http://www.advancedconcepts.com/domain.html>;
* <http://www.advancedconcepts.com/domregis.html>;

The URLs in

* <http://www.advancedconcepts.com/vserfea.html>;
* <http://www.advancedconcepts.com/website.html>;
* <http://www.advancedconcepts.com/ordrblnk.html>;
* <http://www.advancedconcepts.com/>;
* <http://www.advancedconcepts.com/examples.html>

Complaint, supra note 14.
91. Compare this situation with domain name disputes in which a company's trademark is
incorporated into an infringer's URL (e.g., <http://www.mcdonalds.com>). See generally
Friedman & Seibert, supra note 28.
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provide their indexing services in any manner they please.92 Although these companies do not charge for inclusion in their databases
(unlike the Yellow Pages, for instance), they certainly have the right to
exclude Web sites that engage in Meta-Tag abuse from their databases.
In fact, market theory seems to suggest that it would be wise to do so,
since Meta-Tag abuse certainly affects the ability of the search engine
to make efficient and effective keyword matches. Assuming that it is
in the best interests of search engines to combat Meta-Tag abuse, it
seems likely that AltaVista would have forced the defendants to change
their Meta-Tags if Oppedahl & Larson had merely requested that they
do so. This is effectively the same result that was reached by the
Oppedahl & Larson court after months of pre-trial expense.93
B.

"Choice of Law" Problems Exacerbated in Cyberspace

Without delving too deeply into the morass of jurisdictional
problems begotten by the Internet, a discussion of related "choice of
law" concerns is appropriate. The use of federal trademark law, not
to mention state law causes of action, to decide Internet disputes will
certainly amount to inconsistent legal precedent globally. While these
94
inconsistencies have manifested themselves in many other contexts,
none seems as troublesome as the context of the Internet. David G.
Post, an associate law professor at Temple University, has addressed
this exact dilemma:
"If I publish something, should I be hauled into court in Singapore
because my Web site can be received there?" Post asks. "If the
answer is yes, then I also must be subject to the laws of every
country in the world simultaneously. And then the country with
the most restrictive set of laws will monopolize rule making for the
entire net. That can't be right." '

92. Many search engines do not even use Meta-Tag technology to conduct their services.
See Alvarez, supra note 13, at 8.
93. This situation seems to show that the market is the best source of regulation at this
time. However, because this section of the Comment focuses on current problems and not
potential solutions, an in-depth analysis of this and other potential alternatives may be found in
Section IV.
94. One instance is the determination of the correct liability structure to be instituted for
copyright infringement by independent service providers (ISPs). Compare Playboy Enter. Inc. v.
Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that a traditional strict liability copyright
infringement scheme is appropriate), with Sega v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(instituting a contributory infringement liability scheme).
95. See Carl S. Kaplan, Finding Government's Role in a Global Network, N.Y. TIMES ON
THE WEB, CyberTimes (July 10, 1997) <http://search.nytimes.com/books/search/..etdoc+cyberlib+cyber-lib+l 7494+21 ++law>.
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Once a Web page is posted to the World Wide Web, it is
instantly visible globally. Under the current scheme of things, the laws
of every country, state or municipality that can receive a Web page can
theoretically determine the validity of the Meta-Tags in that Web site.
Jack Goldsmith, assistant professor of law at the University of Chicago,
has stated that such issues "are not really any different from those
presented by current trans-border transactions," because "cyberspace
relations. . . are no different from telephone relations and smoke-signal
relations."9 6 However, this view seems flawed, as telephone and
smoke-signal communications are not receivable simultaneously in
every country in the world. Before companies trust the commercial
environment of the Internet, consistent standards that will transcend
governmental borders need to be established.
The Internet has globalized communications and is certain to
globalize commerce. A successful global environment depends upon
laws that are tailored to the unique nature of Internet transactions and
are consistent across governmental borders. The current litigationoriented alternatives to resolve Meta-Tag disputes are insufficient to
achieve these necessary ends.
V. RECONCILING THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST INTERNET
REGULATION WITH THE CONCERNS ABOUT COMMERCIAL
STABILITY IN CYBERSPACE

Even though the Internet was created by the American Department of Defense,97 it seems that the philosophy espoused in many a
chat room is grounded in regulatory trepidation.9" The Clinton
Administration must be attuned to this philosophy, since its A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (Framework) sings the praises of
a laissez faire approach to electronic commerce regulation.99

96. Id.
97. See Amy Knoll, Comment, Any Which Way But Loose: Nations Regulate the Internet,
4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 275, 276 (1996).
98. See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, Declarationof the Independence of Cyberspace(visited Sept.
16, 1998), <http://www.eff.org>. "Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of
flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of the Mind. On behalf of the future,
I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty
where we gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no

greater authority than that which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global special space
we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have
no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to
fear." Id.
99. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 24.
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President Clinton's Framework is based on the notion that "for
electronic commerce to flourish, the private sector must continue to
lead." 1 ' The Administration supports a system of industry selfregulation, where the government encourages and supports the efforts
of private sector organizations to develop mechanisms to facilitate the
successful operation of the Internet.'
The Framework warns against
undue restrictions on electronic commerce because "government
attempts to regulate are likely to be outmoded by the time they are
finally enacted, especially to the extent such regulations are technologyspecific."' 0 2
There are other compelling reasons for a laissez-faire approach to
governmental regulation. Economies of scale and the elimination of
"middlemen" are two reasons why Internet commerce is desirable. 10 3
Government regulation is not only cumbersome, it is also costly and
would interfere with the current economic advantages that the World
Wide Web offers companies.
Furthermore, because electronic
commerce should be facilitated on a global basis,0 4 federal or state
legislation or judicial review seems counterintuitive.
The best rationale for keeping the government off the Net is
simply that the market should decide.
Ultimately, the strongest argument for self-regulation is that it
works. Under the current laissez-faire approach, cyberspace has
experienced exponential growth measured by the total number of
users, total volume or dollar value of commerce, and the advancement of the technology. Further, the technology, software, and
infrastructure has responded virtually instantaneously to meet every
perceived need or to protect against perceived dangers. Thus,
experience in 5 cyberspace militates for a hands-off approach by
0

government.1

Gibbons's article goes on to suggest that governments should
encourage a self-regulation model. 6 However, regulation by service
providers, domain name registration services, search engines and

100. Id. at 4.
101.

See id.

102. Id.
103. One need only look at the success of Amazon.com, located at <http://www.
amazon.com>, to see that wholesaling on the World Wide Web is a lucrative business
opportunity.

104. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 24.
105. Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation:
Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 475, 484 (1997).
106. See id. at 510. See also FRAMEWORK, supra note 24.
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individual webmasters poses problems as well. Giving these companies
policing power makes them, in effect, pseudo-governmental regulatory
agencies. Furthermore, these are private companies in existence to
make a profit and have no desire to become cyberspace watch-dogs,
Web-police, or Internet tribunals. However, self-regulation models
like Cybersitter, Net Nanny, and SurfWatch, 1 7 have done much
more to combat the evils of on-line pornography than the amendments
to the Communications Decency Act (CDA) struck down as unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU." °'
Regardless of the problems that both self-regulation and governmental regulation present, the Internet community must choose
between them or settle on a combination of the two. Judging from the
litany of Internet-based legislation currently before Congress" 9 and
ever-increasing judicial intervention,' a regulation-free Internet is
never going to happen. "The no regulation model is a null choice
because, in cyberspace, the idyllic state of nature never actually
existed."'' The popularization of the information superhighway has
alerted judges, legislatures, and governments that the Internet is a place
where real wrongs take place."' The only question is whether those
governments regulate the remedies themselves or allow the Internet
community the freedom to self-regulate.
No one wants the governments of the world stifling the innovations of the Internet. However, with the rise of electronic commerce,
there is rising concern about whether innovation can continue without
a legal structure supported by those self-same governments. The
Clinton Administration undoubtedly endorses the "less is more" theory
of regulation, but it is not oblivious to the fact that the future of
electronic commerce also depends upon the stability that only
government involvement can provide. Framework states, "Where
government intervention is necessary to facilitate electronic commerce,

107. These are programs that block a PC user's access to offensive materials on the Internet,
including World Wide Web and FTP sites, "alternative" newsgroups, chat rooms, gophers, and
e-mails. See Gibbons, supra note 105, at 513.
108. 521 U.S. at 844.
109. See, e.g., H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997) (prevention of misappropriation of collections
of information), H.R. 2326, 105th Cong. (1997) (Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of
1998), H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995) (Copyright Protection Act of 1995).
110. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom OnLine Comm'n Serv., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Sega Enter., Ltd., v. MAPHIA, 857
F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla.
1993).
111. Gibbons, supra note 105, at 501.
112. See id.
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its goal should be to ensure competition, protect intellectual property
and privacy, prevent fraud, foster transparency, support commercial
transactions, and facilitate dispute resolution. '"113
The European Commission (EC) is taking this proposition even
further. They are moving ahead with concrete plans to develop 14a
regulatory scheme for electronic commerce in the European Union.,
The EC's first objective is to build trust and confidence in the Internet
by establishing a regulatory and institutional legal framework.1 The
second objective is to ensure full access for electronic commerce to the
Single Market." 6 Echoing the earlier critique of the current "choice
of law" alternatives, the EC believes that full access cannot be achieved
when different governmental units are developing divergent approaches
that are ineffective given the transfrontier nature of electronic
commerce." 7
Clinton's Framework suggests that "governments
should establish a predictable and simple legal environment based on
a decentralized, contractual model of law rather than one based on topdown regulation.""' 8 The EC has done more than suggest such a
contractual model, they have adopted one." 9
Both the United States government and the EC realize that there
is a need for commercial stability on the Internet. If speedy resolutions
to commercial Internet disputes are not available, many advantages to
using the Internet commercially are lost. These lost advantages include
speed, user confidence, and efficiency. The Clinton Administration's
Framework and the EC's response show that both understand that
market theory does not work in a chaotic, anarchic atmosphere. It is
now time for them to act upon that understanding and to put a
trustworthy legal framework in place. That legal framework begins
with judicial deference to problems that can be dealt with through
technological means or the electronic marketplace, especially in the
short term.
This brings us back to Meta-Tags. The theories embodied in
Clinton's Framework do very little to help resolve these disputes. It is
one thing to outline the need for a "contractual model of law" that will

113.

FRAMEWORK, supra note 24, at 5.

114. See European Union Considers Regulatory Framework for Electronic Commerce, 16 No.
12 BANKING POLY REP. 10 (1997).

115. See id.
116. See id. at 11. This "single market" refers to the Unified European Economic Market.
Id.
117. See id.
118.

FRAMEWORK, supra note 24, at 5.

119. See European Union ConsidersRegulatory FrameworkforElectronic Commerce, supra note
113, at 12.
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"support commercial transactions" and "facilitate dispute resolution." 120 It is quite another to actually put such principles into
practice.12' Before implementing either legislative or judicial "fixes"
to Internet disputes that could potentially stunt Internet expansion,
lawmakers should first evaluate the ability of the marketplace to
remedy the problem. A message to both the Clinton Administration
and the judiciary: Although there are certainly problems that need to
be legally addressed, a solid foundation for enacting or judicially
creating a regulation model is continued deference to the workings of
the electronic marketplace. Meta-Tag abuse seems to qualify as a
prime example of an instance where the Internet community should be
allowed to police itself.
VI. POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES: A FEASIBILITY,
PRACTICALITY, AND EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

Because this author does not wish only to criticize, a few potential
solutions to the Meta-Tag abuse problem are listed below. The
attendant feasibility, practicality, and effectiveness analysis is couched
both in terms specific to the Meta-Tag problem and that address
Internet regulation in general. Three potential solutions are listed
below:
A.

Amendments to the Lanham Act

This Comment rests on the proposition that federal trademark law
is not the correct vehicle with which to combat Meta-Tag abuse.
Trademark laws were not enacted with Meta-Tag abuse in mind, and
the invisible nature of Meta-Tags distinguishes them from every
trademark that has ever been deemed to be infringed. One potential
alternative is for Congress to enact legislation specifically targeted at
the Meta-Tag problem in the form of an amendment to the Lanham
Act. Before doing so, Congress should evaluate the effectiveness of a
proposed amendment, the likelihood of an amendment stunting
technological growth, and the amenability of a global marketplace to
Internet regulation.

120. FRAMEWORK, supra note 24, at 5.
121. Compare FRAMEWORK, supra note 24, with "A European Initiative in Electronic
Commerce" (as described in European Union Consider Regulatory Framework for Electronic
Commerce, supra note 113, at 10). The EC is currently crafting legislation to regulate all aspects
of electronic commerce rather than merely discussing such regulations on a theoretical level. See
European Union Considers Regulatory Framework for Electronic Commerce, supra note 113, at 10.
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1. Technological Growth

To understand the argument that amendments to the Lanham Act
may stunt technological growth, it is informative to look to proposed
copyright legislation. In 1995, the House of Representatives proposed
HR 2441, the "National Information Infrastructure Copyright
Protection Act of 1995," to amend Section 106 of the Copyright Act
This amendment was
to include a new "transmission" right. 2
intended to extend a copyright holder's rights to include the exclusive
right to transmit copies and phonorecords of his/her copyrighted
works. 123 Members of the Digital Future Coalition (DFC) objected
to the amendment on the ground that "it fails to sustain the principle
of balance, placing a nearly exclusive emphasis on the protection for
copyrighted content, and doing so at the expense of promoting
innovation, privacy, education and public information access. "124
While they recognized the need to fight piracy, the DFC believed
that legislative interference with the current on-line environment could
"frustrate competition in the market for digital goods and services,
125
[and] stifle innovation and job creation in the private sector .
The DFC advises that "a deliberate process of copyright law revision
is more likely to produce results which will stand the tests of time and
'
the marketplace than a process driven by a false sense of urgency." 126
Whenever proposed legislation is going to cause drastic change in the
current methodologies of the electronic environment, the advice of the
DFC seems sound.
While the Meta-Tag dispute deals with trademark and not
copyright law, the advice of the DFC still applies. If Congress were
to enact legislation to allow trademark law to govern the content of
programming code, it would effectively stifle Meta-Tag technology.
If companies are unsure about the legitimacy of the Meta-Tags they
use, the effectiveness of the technology is lost. If programmers are
reluctant to write new software for fear of liability under trademark
law, their dilemma is perfectly analogous to the dilemma the DFC
visualizes in the copyright regime. The DFC is concerned that
programmers will not create new technology if that technology
implicates "transmission" of copyrighted material. Congress should
122. H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995).
123. See id.
124. Statement of Members of the Digital Future Coalition on H.R. 2441 at <http://www.
dfc.org/dfc/legislat/copyrigh.htm> (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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similarly be wary of stunting innovation by using trademark law to
regulate programming code until it is certain that the market is not
effectively dealing with the problem.
2. Amenability of the Global Marketplace
An amendment to the Lanham Act will only serve to regulate
trademark infringement occurring within American borders. American
127
territorialism is a widely discussed subject in domain name cases.
"Long-arm statutes" allow for jurisdiction when both parties are
American corporations, as in cases like Oppedahl & Larson. However,
the costs for a foreign trademark owner to bring suit in the United
States might prove prohibitive, 128 especially if the dispute were
simply about the existence of the foreign plaintiffs trademark in the
defendant's Meta-Tag code. This problem would be exacerbated if
different countries were to treat Meta-Tag regulation differently.
Plaintiffs would look to the most prohibitive countries in which to
bring suit, and defendants would find the least prohibitive country in
which to upload their sites to the World Wide Web. This behavior
is termed "regulatory arbitrage." 129
The novel issues arising out of Meta-Tag and Internet technology
are important topics of discussion and analysis. While this novelty
mandates brainstorming and evaluation, the time may not be right for
Congress to enact reactionary legislation. Because the Internet is a
global enterprise and because legislative interference with programming
code could stifle technological growth, a federal amendment to the
Lanham Act is ill-advised at this time. The global nature of the
Internet mandates a global solution.
B.

InternationalTreaties and Combined Efforts to Regulate

The global nature of the Internet would necessitate the development of a multinational agreement on how the Internet should be
regulated. While international treaties are obviously difficult to
negotiate and finalize, history shows that these treaties are made when
the global economy and free market are implicated.

127. See, e.g., David W. Maher, Trademark Law on the Internet-Will it Scale? The
Challenge to Develop InternationalTrademark Law, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
3 (1997).
128. See id. at 11.
129. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, BORDERS
IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE

129 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds. 1997).
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One example of an economy-driven, free-market motivated treaty
is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The basic
goals of NAFTA are to:
eliminate trade barriers;
promote conditions of fair competition;
increase investment opportunities;
provide adequate protection for intellectual property rights;
establish effective procedures for its implementation and
application; and
(6) provide for the resolution of disputes among the signatures of
the agreement."'

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

The benefits of addressing immigration, narcotics, and environmental
protection, coupled with the obvious benefits arising from a larger
countries to overcome territorial
market base, motivated the signature
31
differences and pass NAFTA. 1
Another treaty-formed organization based on free-market
principles is the European Community (EC). A hot topic in the EC
recently has been the role of intellectual property rights.1 3 2 The
focus has been to resolve problems stemming from the territorial
nature of Member State-created intellectual property rights. 13 3 The
importance of uniform laws regarding intellectual property motivated
the EC Member States to create a Community law that overrides the
134
territorialist intellectual property laws of the Member States.
Again, when the free market is implicated, different nations are able to
agree on a transnational regulation structure.
Finally, the international agreement that best analogizes a
transnational Internet regulation agreement is the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO). WIPO grew out of the 1883 Paris
Convention treaty on patents and trademarks and the 1886 Berne
Today, it administers 20 major
Convention on copyrights."3
intellectual property treaties and promotes the adoption of new
treaties. 3 6 Again, countries recognized the need for uniform regula130. See generally THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 1, 7-8 (Bernard D.
Reams, Jr. & Jon S. Schultz eds., 1994).
131. See Larry Bakken, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Foundationfor a
New Trade Alliance, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 329 (1995).
132. See Andreas Reindl, Intellectual Property and Intra-Community Trade, 20 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 819 (1997).
133. See id. at 819.
134. See id.
135. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Ralph Oman, The World Intellectual Property Organization: A United Nations Success Story, 79 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 691, 692 (1997).
136. See id.
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tion that would transcend territorial borders when inventions, original
creations, and valuable trademarks were implicated.
There are certainly problems that will hinder the ability of nations
to agree on an Internet regulation treaty. These problems include
scope issues, cultural differences, varying standards of computer
technology and telecommunications networks, inherent difficulties in
reaching a consensus, and the possible inability to enforce a binding
agreement. 3 7 However, as countries grasp the economic implications
that walk hand-in-hand with electronic commerce, a global Internet
policy encompassing a large spectrum is sure to be agreed upon, just
like the policies behind NAFTA, the EC, and WIPO. This author is
not advocating that countries mobilize to do battle with Meta-Tag
abuse, but simply that the United States legislature and judiciary
should allow the market to regulate until a global agreement can be
reached. Until progress can be made towards a global agreement, selfregulation seems to be the most viable and logical option to deal with
the majority of Internet disputes, including Meta-Tag abuse.
C. Self-Regulation by Search Engines
The theoretical problems with an amendment to the Lanham Act
and the logistical problems with a global treaty bring us back to a
market based, self-regulatory solution. Search engine regulation of
Meta-Tag disputes is a more efficient, more uniform, and less costly
alternative than court orders, under either the current scheme or a
proposed new Lanham Act scheme. This is true because the likely
outcome of valid Meta-Tag abuse complaints will simply be a court
order mandating that the defendants delete two words from their
programming code, with or without the addition of court costs and
attorneys' fees. While courts must continue to play a role in deciding
some Internet disputes, judicial deference to a self-regulatory scheme
is in the best interests of Meta-Tag litigants specifically, and the Web
culture in general.
Another benefit of the private self-regulatory model is the fact that
private companies are not as constrained by political borders as are
governments. Self-regulation will avoid many jurisdictional and
"choice of law" concerns,"' because contractual and market driven
schemes transcend territoriality. Allowing Meta-Tag disputes to be
self-regulated ameliorates both jurisdictional and "choice of law"
concerns, while showing the denizens of the Web that the government

137. See Knoll, supra note 96, at 300-01.
138. See generally Kaplan, supra note 2.
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does not wish to interfere in every contentious issue that arises on the
Internet.
The idea that search engines should police the behavior of those
benefiting from their services is not a novel one. In the domain name
context, this type of alternative is already being used.' 39 Network
Solutions, Inc. (NSI) is a private registry, under contract from the
National Science Foundation, that assigns the vast majority of domain
names. 4 ° In the face of complaints from trademark owners, NSI
reacted by instituting a self-regulatory process.' 41 The most important element of this self-regulation was a "Domain Name Dispute
Policy," where registered trademark owners can challenge an infringer's
domain ownership. The tenets of the original scheme are essentially
that: (1) applicants can obtain only one domain: (2) they must pay a
fee to receive a domain; and (3) registered trademark owners, both
domestic and foreign, can challenge "identical" domains by submitting
a registration certificate to NSI. 4 2 Although NSI's "Dispute Policy"
is an extremely efficient way in which to deal with domain name
disputes, the system came under attack for being biased in favor of
those who have obtained federal or international trademark registrations, as opposed to those who may have a case for common law
43
protection. 1
A litigant's choice to seek redress in the courts rather than
through a private company can be seen as a major problem with selfregulation. In other words, without government endorsement, selfregulation may not prove effective.1 44 And while the Internet Society
formed the Internet Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) to finalize domain
name assignment policy as an alternative to self-regulation, 14 1 there
is no guarantee that those methods will be effective without government support. However, the IAHC's inception itself shows that
members of the Internet culture are attempting to take domain name
disputes out of the hands of the judiciary, in the belief that a selfregulation model is the best regulatory scheme at this time.

139. See gene-rally Sally M. Abel & Marilyn Tiki Dare, Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: The
Brave New Frontier, 486 Practising L. Inst./Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series 381 (1997).
140. See id. at 384.
141. See id. at 388-89.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 390.
144. Note the rash of domain name cases that bypassed NSI's dispute system and appeared
in American courts of law. See id. See also Friedman & Siebert, supra note 28.
145. See Able & Dare, supra note 138, at 401.
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Leaving domain names and other Internet disputes aside, courts
should defer to the market's ability to regulate Meta-Tag abuse.
Search engines are in a much better position to pull offending Web
sites from their indexes than are courts. Furthermore, self-regulation
is in the best interests of search engines, as keyword uniformity ensures
efficient, specific search processes. In fact, search engines are already
competing in the Meta-Tag sphere, because Excite's search engine
software facilitates searches without using Meta-Tags. As President
Clinton's administration realized before releasing the Framework,
Internet regulation should be kept to a minimum. In order to ensure
this, some areas of Internet regulation must be left to the marketplace.
Meta-Tag technology has created one of those areas.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Meta-Tag technology has created a type of dispute that has
heretofore never been addressed by our courts. Invisible keywords are
inserted into programming code in order to facilitate on-line information searches. Programmers have not resisted the temptation to include
famous words in their Meta-Tag code to increase the traffic to their
Web sites. The use of trademarked words in Meta-Tag code has
sparked controversy. However, traditional trademark remedies were
not put in place to deal with invisible programming code. Therefore,
trademark law should not be used to regulate Meta-Tag disputes.
President Clinton addressed the correct type of regulation scheme in
his A Frameworkfor Global Economic Commerce, when he advocated a
laissez-faire approach to Internet regulation. While there are obviously
some Internet disputes that need to be addressed by the judiciary, it is
important to be cautious in choosing which disputes merit judicial
attention. American courts can go a long way in supporting the
growth of the Internet by allowing many disputes to be regulated
through technology or the marketplace. Judicial deference to the
marketplace in the Meta-Tag context will send the message that
American courts support experimentation and development of
electronic commerce and the Internet.

